|
At its 27th Central Executive
Committee Meeting held on September 13, RENGO endorsed the 19th House
of Councilors Election “Conclusion” held at the end of July.
The Conclusion includes “RENGO’s Basic Target,” “Election
Results,” “Struggle Summary,” “Future Political
Activities and National Elections,” and so forth.
| 1. Circumstances
and Issues at this House of Councilors Election |
The official announcement at the 19th House
of Councilors Election on July 12th and the casting and tallying of ballots
on the 29th led to Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) victory and maintenance
of a comfortable majority by the LDP/New Komeito Party/New Conservative
Party coalition camp. Big changes surrounded circumstances and several
issues in this Upper House Election.
Prime Minister Mori, elected in April 2000 by the three ruling
parties: the LDP, New Komeito, and New Conservative, survived last June’s
42nd House of Representatives Election maintaining his administration
and containing an insurgency of House of Representatives member Koichi
Kato last fall. However the Mori administration’s support rate had
been hovering at low levels due to an ailing economy, a fiscal balance
deficit, unpopularity, etc.
Alarmed by this situation, the LDP rushed to elect a new LDP
party president by moving up the election date. Against all odds, House
of Representatives member Junichiro Koizumi was elected as the new president
on April 24 with overwhelming support from rank-and-file party members.
Koizumi then took the Prime Minister’s seat on the 26th after gaining
acceptance from the LDP, New Komeito and New Conservative Parties.
Since the LDP presidential election Prime Minister Koizumi
asserted “LDP reform” by claiming “structural reform without
exception” and consequently received enormous public support of 80-90%.
This turned out to be a literal “Koizumi Boom” as everyone called
it.
This “Koizumi Boom” also helped the LDP win the
Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly election regarded as a prelude to the House
of Councilors election. The oppositional Democratic Party of Japan won
22 seats at this election, nine seats more than they had at re-election,
but many were narrow victories and the rate of obtained votes lagged far
behind that of the LDP.
Taking place under these political circumstances the Upper
House election foreshadowed severe election results for the Democratic
Party and its supporter, RENGO. For their constituencies, two points were
the main issues at this election.
| (1) |
The Verdict on the Koizumi Administration’s
“Structural Reform without Exception” |
| |
The “Structural Reform without
Exception” that Prime Minister Koizumi has been calling for
are seen as the “backbone principles” of how Japanese
politics, economics and society should be changed. Yet the direction
and vision of this reform were vague, lacking specific details and
far from what the LDP promised during the elections. Nevertheless
the election was to determine how voters would cast their verdict
on the powerful message and performance of “carrying out the
reform.” |
| (2) |
The DPJ’s Presentation of Alternatives
to “Structural Reform” and its Evaluation |
| |
“Koizumi Reform” is a
market-dominant notion that stresses efficiency and competition,
and inflicts pain on the people. In response to this, the opposition
parties, especially the Democratic Party of Japan—the leading
party among them, questioned the true nature of “structural
reform” during this race and presented alternatives for future
visions. It was in this election that the DPJ would receive the
public’s judgement as to which would be the true reform for
the people and moreover, which political party would be responsible
for Japanese politics—the LDP or the DPJ. |
| 2. Activities to
Drive the 3 Ruling Parties Out of the Majority |
RENGO inaugurated
its Political Center in October 1999 to centralize political activities.
Following the Lower House election in June 2000, this Upper House election
was the second national election for RENGO since that inauguration—and
this election begged public judgement of the worth of RENGO’s political
activities as well as for its election struggle.
RENGO formulated its “Principle for the 19th House of
Councilors Election (Part 1)” last October and endorsed the following
three points for activities:
(1)Criticize policies of the ruling coalition administration of the Liberal
Democratic Party, the New Komeito Party, and the New Conservative Party
and seek to achieve RENGO’s policies and systems demands, (2) Drive
the three ruling parties out of the majority and seek to establish a Democratic
Party of Japan-led government at the next general election, (3) Further
integrate RENGO’s political activities both in name and reality based
on the last House of Representatives election.
RENGO also decided on (Part 2) of the Principles in February
of this year and endorsed concrete activities for affiliated organizations
and local RENGO. Based on those Principles, RENGO fought the election
race under the following basic goals.
| (1) |
Activities for the Victory of All RENGO-Recommended Candidates |
| |
RENGO endorsed 9 candidates from union organizations
for proportional representatives and 48 candidates for constituency
system in 47 prefectures (73 seats up for re-election) centering
on the DPJ, and pursued victory for all of its recommended candidates.
The breakdown by parties follows: 35 DPJ, 1 Social Democratic Party,
1 Liberal Party, and 11 nonparty candidates. Affiliated organizations
and local RENGO joined forces comprehensively and made efforts to
enhance the synergy at the election race. |
| (2) |
Activities to Drive the 3 Ruling Parties Out of the Majority |
| |
This House of Councilors election was meant
to achieve a reverse of the ruling and the opposition parties, drive
the LDP/New Komeito/New Conservative coalition from the majority,
and most importantly seek a change of administration in upcoming
House of Representatives elections. Indispensable for this was DPJ-led
electoral cooperation by the opposition groups.
The DPJ, Social Democratic Party, Liberal Party and the Independents
(Mushozoku no Kai) signed the “Four Party Election Cooperation
Agreement for the 19th House of Councilors Regular Election”
and endorsed that they would cooperate in 13 single-seat constituency
districts. DPJ/LP bipartisan electoral cooperation was also arranged.
RENGO took the opposition parties’ cooperation seriously and
endorsed full-scale support. |
The Liberal Democratic
Party gained a sweeping victory just as the mass media had predicted before
the election. On the other hand, the Democratic Party of Japan gained
26 seats, 1 seat less than in the 1998 Upper House election held right
after the party’s inauguration. The result was feckless, reduced
by more than six million ballots in this proportional representation election
compared to the number of votes obtained in last year’s Lower House
election.
Voter turnout was 56%, the third lowest ever, even lower than
that of the previous House of Councilors election. Although final analysis
is still forthcoming, low voter turnout rates may have stemmed from: (1)
people’s distrust and anxiety over the “structural reform”
that the Koizumi administration is conducting, (2) distrust of the election
system, or (3) a reaction to predictions of a landslide LDP victory.
| (1) |
Activities for the Victory of All RENGO-Recommended Candidates |
| |
RENGO endorsed 9 candidates from
union organizations for proportional representatives and 48 candidates
for constituency system in 47 prefectures (73 seats up for re-election)
centering on the DPJ, and pursued victory for all of its recommended
candidates. The breakdown by parties follows: 35 DPJ, 1 Social Democratic
Party, 1 Liberal Party, and 11 nonparty candidates. Affiliated organizations
and local RENGO joined forces comprehensively and made efforts to
enhance the synergy at the election race. |
| (2) |
Activities to Drive the 3 Ruling Parties Out of the Majority |
| |
This House of Councilors election
was meant to achieve a reverse of the ruling and the opposition
parties, drive the LDP/New Komeito/New Conservative coalition from
the majority, and most importantly seek a change of administration
in upcoming House of Representatives elections. Indispensable for
this was DPJ-led electoral cooperation by the opposition groups.
The DPJ, Social Democratic Party, Liberal Party and
the Independents (Mushozoku no Kai) signed the “Four Party
Election Cooperation Agreement for the 19th House of Councilors
Regular Election” and endorsed that they would cooperate in
13 single-seat constituency districts. DPJ/LP bipartisan electoral
cooperation was also arranged.
RENGO took the opposition parties’ cooperation
seriously and endorsed full-scale support. |
| (3) |
Election Results for RENGO-Endorsed Candidates |
| |
Out of the 57 candidates RENGO
recommended (48 in prefectural constituencies and 9 in proportional
representatives) 20 won seats for constituencies and 6 for proportional
representatives.
Among these were candidates from union organizations
who were voted into office—6 by proportional representation
and 6 by prefectural constituencies in Miyagi, Gunma, Chiba, Kanagawa,
Gifu and Hyogo. |
| 4. Evaluation of
the Electoral Results |
We should take these election results
seriously since they represent the people’s judgement of politics.
However, the overwhelming victory of the LDP does not necessarily mean
that the Koizumi administration has won the absolute confidence.
Counteroffers from either side were not indefinitely shown.
Prime Minister Koizumi did not clarify the specific content of his “structural
reform” and the leading opposition party, the DPJ, could only present
sterile alternatives that competed merely on the speed of reform, not
pointing out the true nature or errant direction of Koizumi reform. The
DPJ could not sufficiently appeal to voters who hesitated to cast their
ballots for the LDP but supported Koizumi Reform. It appears that confidence
in the DPJ was quite weak.
Furthermore, it is conceivable that images amplified in the
media may have influenced some voters’ rational judgement. The low
voter turnout rate of 56% might also suggest voter confusion.
| (1) |
Election in a Proportional Representation
System and Its Evaluation |
| |
The election was conducted using
both the non-binding vote system and the constituency system. The
first race under the non-binding vote system ended in defeat for
RENGO. RENGO backed nine candidates from labor organizations and
fought to win at all costs. However the number of seats gained based
on actual votes proportionally was 8 for the DPJ. Among the DPJ
candidates, two celebrities won enough ballots so that only 6 RENGO-backed
candidates won, 3 lost.
These results had a grave impact on every organization in RENGO,
especially the nine affiliated organizations that backed the candidates.
Despite changes in the election system last fall, these nine affiliated
organizations created a 6-10 month election campaigns to spread
their candidates’ names to union members and the people. But
those candidates only ended up with 1.7 million votes.
Judging from a candidate name recognition survey by
the affiliated organizations and media exit polls, many union members
seemed to vote by political party. This does not excuse the fact
that RENGO’s all-out activities to make voting by personal
name known to everybody resulted in these circumstances.
It was also a serious loss for the DPJ which endorsed
28 candidates in the proportional representatives election. In the
1998 House of Councilors election, right after founding the DPJ,
they won 12.21 million votes for 12 seats. But this time the DPJ
lost many non-partisan votes to the LDP, maintaining some 8.99 million
votes (approx. 6.08 million ballots by party, approx. 2.91 million
ballots by individual candidate). The number of DPJ votes gained/victorious
candidates was drastically reduced compared with the last election.
SDP, however, had three candidates who won office/3.63
million ballots, and the Liberal Party garnered 4.23 million ballots
for four people. |
| (2) |
Elections in a Constituency System and their
Evaluation |
| |
The constituencies races were under
unfavorable conditions, severe for both candidates endorsed by the
DPJ/opposition parties and nonpartisan candidates.
| 1. |
Struggles of RENGO endorsed candidates |
| |
Results for RENGO endorsed
candidates at constituencies was 20 win and 28 loss. Except
in Nagano prefecture where RENGO endorsed two candidates officially
on the DPJ ticket, RENGO fought for its candidates in each
constituency. RENGO was completely defeated in single-seat
constituencies, excluding Iwate and Mie prefectures, but won
in 18 districts in 20 multiple-seat constituencies. These
results were due to local RENGO who supported with all of
their means, which was highly admirable.
Further, those election campaigns made it possible
for local RENGO to broaden the range of their activities,
including cooperation with regional organizations that RENGO
had no access to before. This valuable experience should be
used whenever we think of future organizational expansion. |
| 2. |
Struggles of DPJ and other opposition
party candidates |
| |
Although it failed to gain
seats in single-seat constituencies, the DPJ secured 18 seats
in multi-seat constituencies competing against others like
the Japan Communist Party. The DPJ narrowly maintained its
status as the leading opposition party, or as one of the two
major parties capable of withstanding the LDP amidst the overwhelming
“Koizumi Boom.”
On the other hand, the Social Democratic Party
lost seats in Ooita and Fukuoka prefectures leaving no seats
in the constituency system. The LP kept its Iwate prefecture
seat and gained one in Niigata.
Despite progress in opposition party electoral
cooperation, those parties’ candidates had to compete
with each other in multiple-seat constituencies. Although
this could not be helped in order to secure ballots for the
proportional representation election, it was regrettable that
this brought about the victory for the LDP. |
| 3. |
Struggles in districts involved in
electoral cooperation |
| |
As written in “Election
Results” above, opposition party electrical cooperation
was consequently insufficient to bear fruit before the “Koizumi
Boom.” However, the fact that the four parties conducted
electoral cooperation is itself worthy of special mention
in the history of Japanese politics. |
|
| 5. Summary of the
Struggles |
For RENGO, this House of Councilor
election meant that it would give influence to the state of labor movement
in the 21st century or its direction. Also the very raison d'etre of RENGO
and labor unions in society were called into question. The results of
this election presented the following grave issues to us. Especially,
the results of the race for proportional representatives provided evidence
that decisions at organizations was not understood or penetrate down to
union members. We should consider this a critical problem which has to
do with the core of organizational management.
| (1) |
To what extent did union members understand
RENGO’s political activities? |
| |
RENGO’s political activities
are the one to realize its demand on policies. Under the current
political power however, we are in a circumstance that it is hard
to achieve our demand. RENGO needs to increase the power of alliance
political parties to break this situation and that is why trade
unions were making efforts on election campaigns. How seriously
union members understood the whole idea should be examined. |
| (2) |
Did the election campaign result in fortifying
the organization? |
| |
RENGO was supposed to work on aiming
to whip up union members’ sentiments and fortify union organization
through the election. However, we need to analyze whether this election
campaign really contributed to the fortification of RENGO organizations
namely affiliates, local organizations and unit unions. Specifically,
it is necessary to check on the kind of functions and roles that
activities for proportional representative elections performed in
fortifying organizations. |
| (3) |
Why did appeals to write in individual candidates’
names fail to reach union members? |
| |
The results of the proportional
representative election shocked RENGO because they showed that only
one in four of its 7.5 million union members wrote in individual
candidates’ names on the ballots.
The nine affiliated organizations that backed their candidates and
their support affiliate groups conducted election campaigns for
over 10 months. Each group collected enrollees for “support
group” that far exceeded the number of union members. This
was because the support organizations called for union members,
their families, and supporters to understand that the representatives
election is the election to vote for candidates’ names and
that they are required to do so.
However the actual result was 1.7 million votes, failing
to gain even 0.2 million ballots per candidate. Several reasons
why candidates names did not penetrate into the electorate are summarized
in the following:
| 1. |
As this was the first time in 21 years
where it was necessary to write individual names, many union
officials were confused about their not knowing the scope
of activities. Also these officials miscalculated that they
might gain as many votes as they once had at a nation-wide
constituency system election where they obtained 0.6 to 1.1
million votes. |
| 2. |
Despite introducing a non-binding list
system combining the Hare system of listing candidates for
the Upper House with the present method of having votes count
only for the parties, electorate and union members were still
bound by conventional party line voting that could not be
wiped away. It appears that a large portion of union members
cast ballots along party lines. |
| 3. |
Under the switch of industry/economic
structure through the 1980s - 90s, union members were exposed
to job insecurity and cut-backs in labor conditions, which
consequently spawned a downturn in unions’ centripetal
force. The loyalty of union members toward trade unions was
also weakened. It is likely that face-to-face dialogues were
not held directly between union officials and union members.
Furthermore, union member sentiment has been changing and
expectations toward politics has also faded. Consequently,
the unions’ power to gather votes has declined. |
| 4. |
Among RENGO and its affiliate organizations,
affiliate organizations and unit unions, unit unions and workplaces,
workplaces and workers, there was wide divergence on the significance
of this Upper House election and attitudes toward activities
regarding it. Moreover, the political awareness, so that organizational
electoral campaigns did not sufficiently operate. |
| 5. |
They spent all their energy in gaining
“supporters” (“collecting cards”) but
did not concentrate on “follow-up activities” (“vote
insuring activities”) afterwards. It has been pointed
out that “vote insuring activities” that zeroed
in on union members and their families would have yielded
better results. |
| 6. |
Last minute activities were not enough.
There were predictions according to the dissemination survey
by affiliated organizations, and the media’s absentee
ballot poll that many union members and electorates vote by
political party names. To prevent this, each organization
tried to make everyone understand candidates’ names by
holding workplace meetings and so forth, at the last stage
of electoral race. This did not produce sufficient results. |
| 7. |
As we watched celebrity candidates win,
the huge influence of the media in contributing to the familiarization
of individual candidate names became apparent. On the other
hand, conventional trade union election campaign styles (such
as bid activity to join support groups, publicizing candidates
by using organizational papers/magazines or pamphlets) did
not get the candidates names thoroughly. |
|
| (4) |
Struggles at constituent elections |
| |
The role that local RENGO played
was significant at election in constituency system. In the midst
of am intense storm from the so-called “Koizumi Boom,”
local RENGO took initiative battles actively. They fought for all
of their recommended candidates including the DPJ to win seats and
show some gain. Especially in multiple-seat constituencies it was
due to local RENGO’s struggle that their candidates competed
and surpassed those of other parties.
Other activities also affected the results, such as
a proactive approach to a wide range of electorate by the women’s
election committee, which consisted of the RENGO Headquarters Election
Committee teamed up with local RENGO. Some of the activities included
street campaigns by the “Want to Fix Japan Brigade,” special
support activities for local RENGO in the metropolitan area, and
so forth.
On the other hand, activities to create a ripple effect
by tying constituency elections and proportional representation
elections advanced activities while establishing the “Industrial
Federation Conference Supporting 9 Candidates (tent.)” in local
RENGO. Some local RENGO have pointed out however that activities
for constituencies were not sufficiently carried out as a result
of affiliated organizations stressing proportional representative
elections. |
| (5) |
Analysis of organizational activities and
union member voting patterns |
| |
RENGO continued with movements
to increase voter turnout, but ultimately the voter turnout rate
remained low. We need to analyze organizational activities and union
members’ voting patterns to know what union member turnout
was at this election, the results our efforts to promote absentee
ballots, what proportion of the ballots had individual names written
on them and how many were for political party names, etc. |
| 6. Future Political
Activities and the National Election |
| (1) |
This House of Councilors election was the 3rd
national election since the Democratic Party of Japan was recently
established in 1998. For RENGO, this was the 2nd election since
the 1999 inauguration of its Political Center. Throughout this Upper
House election the DPJ has identified the following problems: |
| |
| 1. |
The DPJ did not demonstrate enough of
a presence as an alternative power to the LDP that leads the
administration. |
| 2. |
The DPJ did not clearly demonstrate to
voters the idea, direction, and content of its reform plan
versus that of the Koizumi administration’s “structural
reform without exception.” |
| 3. |
The DPJ lacked sufficient effort in disseminating
its basic philosophy and basic policies to the voters despite
the fact that it has been three years since its inauguration.
Neither has it sufficiently established party organizations
nor local activity. |
| 4. |
DPJ lawmakers have not fully fulfilled
their role either nationally or locally. |
|
| (2) |
Remarks by the DPJ described six problem points
including its election machine and electoral cooperation in its
“report on the 19th House of Councilors Regular Election”
compiled on August 27. In it, the DPJ writes with determination
that it will “fight to change power at the next House of Representatives
Election” by “stating its position to throw the ruling
parties into sharp focus against the opposition parties.” Further,
on its relations with support organizations, the report says “activities
by support organizations centering around RENGO and trade unions
of industrial federations were a driving forces in the election
and produced significant results especially in multi-seat districts.
The DPJ would like to advance a cooperative relationship among labor
organizations at the local level in the future as well as overcoming
the vulnerability of local DPJ organizations. |
|
(3)
|
Looking at the ongoing Japanese political
situation and political parties, and considering the nature of the
election system of both Houses, political parties should be converge
on some point like two-party system based on their ideas and policies.
To play a part in this, the DPJ should seriously take the results
of this Upper House election to heart and exert every possible effort
in all aspects of policy, organization and activity. The DPJ should
become a party that will gain the understanding and support of the
nation.
RENGO will expect the DPJ to establish ideas and policies
from the standpoint of a wide range of working citizens and to become
a party capable of taking over the helm of administration. To achieve
this, RENGO will encourage cooperation with the DPJ under a mutually
independent relationship while deepening discussions at every level
of the DPJ. |
|
(4)
|
It is certain that both the Upper House and
the Lower House will have elections within the next three years.
For the next election, RENGO must re-establish its political principles,
political activities and election campaigns in consideration of
the conclusion of those two years of struggles. Every RENGO member
needs to understand the purpose and the necessity of political activities
firmly and steadily cultivate a bond with RENGO, affiliated organizations
and unit unions. |
|
(5)
|
RENGO will continuously and unfailingly put
into practice the initial activities and roles of labor unions at
every level in the workplace, unit unions, industrial federations,
and RENGO headquarters. RENGO will promote direct dialogue and meetings
with union members and work on making an organization that is based
on the actual conditions and needs of the members in the workplace.
In order to do so, the three pillars of “organization,”
“policies,” and “politics” are necessary to
hold up the backbone of RENGO movement.
RENGO will strengthen and expand organizations with
the aim of building a new labor movement based on the “Vision
for the 21st century.” RENGO will enhance policy-making ability
and steadily develop political activities to realize its goal. |
27th Central
Executive Committee Meeting/Items Discussed
| Time: |
September 13,
1:30pm—4:00pm |
| Place: |
RENGO Headquarters |
| 1. |
Activity plans for Fall
2001 Demands on Policies and Systems. |
| 2. |
Immediate activity for Emergency
Employment Measures. |
| 3. |
RENGO’s opinion on
issues under study by the government Regulatory Reform Council. |
| 4. |
Enforcement and Continuation
of “Get a Receipt from your Doctor Campaign.” |
| 5. |
RENGO’s present position
on securing labor credits at the review of bankruptcy legislation. |
| 6. |
7th RENGO Convention (part
2). |
| 7. |
Action Policies for FY 2002-2003
(draft).
| • |
Appended Policy 1;
“the basics of RENGO management and office framework.” |
| • |
Appended Policy 2;
“Making unions / Action Plan 21.” |
|
| 8. |
Work rules sub committee
report. |
| 9. |
Settlement of accounts
for FY 2001 and the FY 2002 budget. |
| 10. |
Draft of 2002 Spring Struggle
“Basic Idea” submission. |
| 11. |
Conclusion of the 19th House
of Councilor election. |
| 12. |
Endorsement of a candidate
for Kobe City mayoral election. |
| 13. |
RENGO’s philanthropy
fund:
| • |
Allocation of the
FY2000 “RENGO philanthropy fund.” |
| • |
Operating Guidelines
for “RENGO philanthropy fund.” |
| • |
Activities for the
FY 2001 “RENGO philanthropy fund.” |
|
| 14. |
Support for the A50 Fulbright
Scholarship Program (A50: a Japanese grass-roots initiative
commemorating the 50th Anniversary of the Signing of the San
Francisco Peace Treaty). |
| 15. |
Other:
| • |
Cooperation with the
FY2001 research execution plan by the JTUC Research
Institute for Advancement of Living Standards (RIALS). |
| • |
Contribution of funds
from the International Solidarity Fund as a token of
sympathy to AFL-CIO. |
| • |
September and October’s
schedule. |
|
|
|
